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Abstract 
The thesis deals with the issue of energy security in the European Union, and the role 
played by Azerbaijan in the provision of the EU’s energy independence and long-term 
stability. The author investigates the current issues of the European Union’s energy policy, 
and the main threats impairing the EU’s energy independence. Countries of the Caspian 
Basin, and particularly Azerbaijan, are investigated as the main alternative suppliers of 
energy resources for the European Union to increase its energy security. The author 
justifies and forecasts the future development of the EU-Azerbaijani relations in the energy 
sector taking into account the current policies implemented by the European Union in the 
field of energy security. 
 
Abstrakt 
Diplomová práce se zabývá problematikou energetické bezpečnosti v Evropské unii, a roli, 
kterou hraje Ázerbájdžán v oblasti poskytování a zajištění energetické nezávislosti a 
dlouhodobé stability v Evropské unii. Autor zkoumá aktuální otázky energetické politiky 
Evropské unie, a hlavní hrozby poškozující energetické nezávislosti Evropské unie. Země 
Kaspického moře, zejména Ázerbájdžán, jsou zkoumány jako hlavní alternativní 
dodavatele energetických zdrojů pro Evropskou unii, aby zvýšila svou energetickou 
bezpečnosti. Autor ospravedlňuje a předpovídá budoucí vývoj vztahů mezi Ázerbájdžánem 
a Evropskou unii v oblasti energetiky s přihlédnutím k současné politiky prováděné 
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TOPIC CARACTERISTICS  
 
The (in)security of energy supply to Europe has come to the focus of public and 
academic attention in recent years. Russia is the largest supplier to the European energy 
market, especially in terms of natural gas – as both a producer and an exporter – which 
means that Russia and the EU are interdependent. To offset this mutual dependency, the 
EU works with alternative energy suppliers, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan, in order to diversify suppliers and pipelines. Using a common energy policy, 
in contrast to the EU, Russia has a major geopolitical role in controlling energy resources in 
the post-Soviet region, especially in Caspian Basin countries. To provide necessary energy 
from outside particularly from Russia is not safe enough, as it was proven several times. As 
stability in the region of Middle East is very fragile, the Caspian basin gains priority for 
providing alternative energy resources and transportation routes. 
My Master thesis will aim to analyze the importance of energy resources of 
Azerbaijan in security of the energy supply of the European Union. That is why, I want to 
Institute International Economic and Political Studies 
Master thesis proposal The role of Azerbaijan in the context of EU energy 
security 
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emphasize why I find it obligatory for Europe (especially for Eastern Europe) to decrease 






1. Lack of alternatives may lead to unfair pricing on energy.  
2. The usage of the Russian “energy weapon” induces Europe to re-think and diversify 
its energy suppliers. 
3. Monopoly of Russian energy supply to the European Union can be reduced by 




The thesis is going to be based mainly on qualitative methods and is going to use an 
interpretative approach. I would like to analyze my research topic through the exploration 
for the paper to have a more comprehensive approach. I also aim to explore bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, documents as well as scientific articles and literature on this issue, 
drawing on secondary sources such as scholarly books and articles, publications, energy 
firm websites, as well as primary sources and European Union decisions and strategies. In 
order to present the realities of the topic from today’s perspective and aim also to observe 
the future perspective, some statistical data will be analyzed in the thesis as well. 
 
Outline: 
1. Introduction and Methodology 
 
2. General framework of EU energy security policy 
2.1. Historical development of the Energy Policy of the EU  
2.2. The role of the governments in European energy policy 
2.3. The importance of Russian hydrocarbon exports for Europe  
 
3. Azerbaijan’s role in ensuring the EU’s energy security 
3.1. Azerbaijani policies towards energy security 
3.2. Energy Geopolitics of Azerbaijan 
3.3 Importance of Caspian basin for the energy security of EU 
 
4. Main challenges for European energy security and role of Azerbaijan as a partner  
4.1. The evolution of EU energy security concept 
4.2. Options for diversification of energy sources and suppliers: role of Azerbaijan 
5. Conclusions 
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Introduction and Methodology 
The issue of security of energy supply to Europe has come to the focus of public 
and academic attention in recent years. Russia is the largest supplier to the European energy 
market, especially in terms of natural gas supplies – both as a producer and exporter – 
which means that Russia and the EU are much interdependent. To offset this mutual 
dependency, the EU works with alternative energy suppliers, such as Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, in order to diversify the suppliers and ways of supplies. 
Using a common energy policy, in contrast to the EU, Russia has a major geopolitical role 
in controlling energy resources in the post-Soviet region, especially in the Caspian Basin 
countries. The supplies of energy resources only from impose significant threats of loss of 
stability on the European Union, as it has already been proven several times. As stability in 
the Middle East is very fragile, the Caspian Basin gains top priority for providing 
alternative energy resources and transportation routes. 
The recent geopolitical trends in Europe have shown that the relations between the 
Russian Federation, one of the world's major superpowers, and the European Union 
become more and more strained. Those tendencies became particularly obvious with 
Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine, and the country's involvement 
in the war in the Eastern regions of Ukraine. The mutual sanctions implemented by the 
European and Russian authorities have shown that the cooperation between Russia and the 
EU may face significant complications in the near future. Moreover, taking into account the 
European Union's utter dependence on Russia in terms of the supplies of energy resources, 
it becomes obvious that the Russian Federation may use the supplies of hydrocarbons as a 
significant lever of tension in its relations with the European Union already in the near 
future. Such tension may consist in changes in the pricing policy, or in the complete 
stoppage of all energy supplies. 
Taking into account the above facts, it becomes obvious that the issue of energy 
security is the European Union's top priority as of today, and the supranational formation 
should seek all possible ways to improve the situation. Therefore, the countries of the 
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Caspian Basin seem to be a perfect option for the European Union to optimize the structure 
of energy imports in all respects. Among those countries, a prominent role could be played 
by Azerbaijan. This is due not only to the fact that the country is a major exporter of 
hydrocarbons in the Eurasian region, but also due to the fact that its authorities maintain 
close relations with the European Union, and the country has lately been gradually 
following its path of European integration. Therefore, there are prospects for the tightening 
cooperation between Azerbaijan and the European Union in all fields in the near future, and 
it is worth investigating more in detail the possible development of mutual cooperation 
between them in the field of energy supplies. 
This Master’s thesis will aim to analyze the importance of Azerbaijan’s energy 
resources for the security of energy supplies to the European Union. The thesis will 
emphasize the author’s opinion why Europe (especially Eastern European countries) should 
decrease its energy and political dependence on Russia in terms of the imports of 
hydrocarbons. 
The main research question is whether Azerbaijan may become a key partner of the 
European Union within framework of the EU's policy aimed at diversifying energy 
supplies. 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the key aspects of the European Energy 
Policy, the possible role which Azerbaijan may play in its implementation, and the 
prospects for the successful development of Azerbaijan-EU relations in the field of energy 
supplies taking into account the current trends on the European energy market. 
 
Hypotheses 
For the purpose of fulfilling the aim of the research and maximizing the added value 
of the thesis, several hypotheses will be tested. 
1. Lack of alternatives in energy supplies may lead to unfair pricing.  
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2. Usage of the Russian “energy weapon” induces Europe to re-think and diversify its 
energy suppliers. 
3. Supplies of energy from Azerbaijan may help significantly diversify the EU’s 
imports of energy resources. 
Methodology  
The thesis will be based mainly on qualitative methods, and will use an interpretative 
approach. The author will analyze the research topic through the exploration of different 
scenarios, for the paper to have a more comprehensive approach. The author also aims to 
explore bilateral and multilateral agreements, documents and scientific articles and 
literature on this topic, drawing on secondary sources such as scholarly books and articles, 
publications, energy firm websites, as well as primary sources and European Union’s 
resolutions and strategies. In order to present the realities of the topic from the today’s 
perspective and to observe the future prospects, some statistical data will be analyzed in the 
thesis as well. 
For the purpose of increasing the added value of the research, bibliographic sources 





1 Investigation of the European Union’s energy policy and 
energy security 
1.1 General framework of EU energy security policy 
Historically, the European Union developed from the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The two communities were 
international organizations uniting European countries, which were mostly aimed at 
ensuring the member states’ energy security, and at governing a large number of issues in 
the energy sector for the purpose of ensuring the long-term sustainable development of 
European states (Orbie 2008, pp. 63-64). This testifies that the development of European 
integration has historically been tightly interconnected with the issues of the European 
states’ energy security, and the energy sector has long remained of a key importance to 
European countries. 
The importance of uninterrupted energy supplies to the European Union remains 
topical as of today. This is due to the fact that the EU member states are unable to fulfill 
their domestic needs in energy in full due to the lack of the required resources. Therefore, 
countries making part of the Union are forced to import energy resources from abroad, and 
therefore are affected by a great number of threats, as they remain dependent on third-party 
energy suppliers (Welfens and Addison 2009, pp. 105-106). As of today, the main suppliers 
of energy resource, namely natural gas and oil, to the European Union are Russia, Norway, 
Canada, Niger, and Kazakhstan. In this context, the European Union has long been trying 
to implement effective policies in the energy sector destined to diversify the sources of 
energy supplies, to develop renewable energy, and to increase the level of energy 
efficiency. Such measures are aimed to decrease the EU’s dependence on energy supplies 
from Russia, and at the same time to increase the own production of energy in the 
conditions of scarce energy resources (Talus 2013, pp. 72-76). 
However, despite the objective preconditions existing in the European Union’s 
energy sector and the EU’s long struggle for the diversification of energy supplies and the 
improvement of its energy industry, the first direct measures to adopt a common Union-
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wide energy policy were only undertaken for the first time in 2005 by the European 
Council. In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon stipulated common policies of the EU member 
states in the field of energy, but still left much of the powers in the energy sector on the 
level of the EU member states’ national governments. Thus, according to Article 194 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union’s energy policy “shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, to ensure the functioning of the energy market; ensure security of 
energy supply in the Union; promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and promote the interconnection of 
energy networks.” (Treaty of Lisbon 2007, Art. 194). The Treaty of Lisbon played an 
important role for the development of the EU member states’ common energy policy, as it 
in fact established the first legal foundations for the effective elaboration of such policy 
within the Union (Müller-Kraenner 2008, pp. 21-24). 
Later the same year, the European Commission published its proposals for the 
improvement of the European Union’s energy sector, namely Proposal 2012/0288 (COD) 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 
2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, and the 
European council adopted those key proposals which should form the backbone of the EU 
member states’ common energy policies. Among other things, the European Commission’s 
proposals for the energy sector include the following: creation of a carbon-free economy 
through a decrease of carbon emissions by 95% by 2050, decrease in the level of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020, increase in the share of biofuels in the EU’s 
energy sector up to 10% by 2020, increase in the share of renewable energy in the structure 
of the European Union’s energy consumption up to 20% by 2020, elaboration of the 
European Strategic Energy Technology Plan aimed at developing the most up-to-date 
technologies in the fields of energy production and conservation, renewable energy, capture 
of emissions, etc. Also, it is particularly worth noting that those proposals stipulate that the 
European Union sees Africa as its key partner in the energy sector, and aims to develop 
mutually beneficial relations with the continent’s countries in this field in the future 
(Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, pp. 133-135). 
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Within the framework of the common European energy policy, the EU member 
states are currently governed by the so-called SET Plan (Strategic Energy Technologies 
Plan) which is destined to increase the research and engineering activities across all 
member states for promoting the development of the European energy sector. The SET 
Plan includes a number of initiatives aimed at promoting particular branches of the 
European energy sector. Thus, the Solar Europe Initiative focuses on the development of 
solar power plants, particularly in Southern European countries, the European Wind 
Initiative  is aimed at developing applications for the wind energy systems and at creating 
new wind power plants in EU member states, the Bioenergy Europe Initiative is destined to 
increase the share of biofuels in the European energy sector, the European Electricity Grid 
System is aimed at developing a smart electricity system common for all EU member states 
which would significantly spare the funds spent by the Union’s authorities on electricity, 
and so on (Jacobs 2012, pp. 66-70). 
The Directive on Electricity Production from Renewable Energy Sources makes 
another important part of the European Union’s energy policy. Under this Directive, target 
indicators are established for member states in terms of the share of renewable energy in 
their aggregate energy production. As of today, the target share of renewable energy to be 
reached by 2020 is established at a level of 20%. This should help significantly diversify 
the sources of energy production in the Union, and should also substantially decrease the 
EU’s dependence on energy supplies from other countries, particularly from Russia (Aalto 
2008, pp. 91-93). 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) adopted in 2005 is 
another regulation making the backbone of the European Union’s energy policy. Under EU 
ETS, caps are set for greenhouse gas emissions for plants, factories, installations, and other 
objects which are pollutants of the ecosphere. Such caps may differ on the national level. A 
system of allowances exists for the greenhouse gas emissions, similarly to the allowances 
provided under the Kyoto Protocol. Such allowances can be traded on the open market. 
This system allows significantly sparing the national governments’ funds, and also 
promotes the industrial manufacturers’ interest in reducing their emissions. The planned 
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caps for 2020 currently amount to a 21% reduction in the aggregate greenhouse gas 
emissions (Proedrou 2011, pp. 106-108). 
Directive 2009/72/EC adopted by the European Union in 2009 governs the field of 
liberalization of the European Union’s energy market. The Directive is mainly aimed at de-
integrating the European energy market by decreasing the role played by governments, and 
at the same time by allowing major corporations running their operations in the energy 
sector without any major government interventions. This is believed to be a prerequisite for 
the effective development of competition on the European energy market, and thus for the 
increased effectiveness of energy production on the EU’s territory (Pedersen, Behrens and 
Egenhofer 2008, pp. 40-41). 
The Directive on the energy performance of buildings wan adopted by the European 
Union within the framework of its Intelligent Energy – Europe Programme for 2003-2006, 
and is still valid as of today. The main aim of the Directive is to ensure the high energy 
performance of residential and non-residential housings with an ultimate aim of reducing 
the consumption of energy by such buildings. For this purpose, inspections of boilers and 
air conditioning systems are stipulated in the Directive, as well as the provision of Energy 
Performance Certificates by the EU member states’ national governments (Morata and 
Solorio Sandoval 2012, pp. 45-47). 
A particularly important role in the implementation of the European Union’s energy 
policy is played by the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation 
(IPEEC), an international forum in the field of energy efficiency with the participation of 
countries from around the globe. The forum is mainly destined to promote the development 
of up-to-date technologies combining the more effective use of energy resources with the 
smaller levels of emissions (Proedrou 2011, pp. 114-115). Within the framework of IPEEC, 
several initiatives play an essential role for the EU in terms of the development and 
implementation of its common energy policy. Thus, MEER (Making Energy Efficiency 
Real) is an initiative aimed at promoting bilateral energy efficiency programmes; sectorial 
initiatives are destined to promote energy efficiency in particular industries and economic 
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branches, etc. Common global policies are elaborated within the framework of IPEEC as 
well (Kuzemko 2012, pp. 290-291). 
The ACEA Agreement between the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association and the European Commission governs the field of emissions in automobile 
transport. Namely, the Agreement assumes gradual decrease in the maximum allowable 
values of carbon dioxide emissions by the car transports. This is particularly important 
taking into account the fact that the automobile transport is the largest air pollutant in 
Europe. However, the ACEA Agreement is voluntary, and isn’t mandatory to comply with 
for the EU member states’ national governments (Pedersen, Behrens and Egenhofer 2008, 
pp. 47-48). 
A particularly important field of the European Union’s energy policy is the research 
and development activities aimed at increasing the energy efficiency of the Union’s 
member states, and at promoting the development of the EU’s energy sector by means of 
innovations. Within this framework, the EU participates in a number of projects the most 
prominent of which are the following: ALTENER (development of new and alternative 
energy sources for reducing the consumption of traditional resources such as natural gas 
and oil), CEPHEUS (implementation of highly energy-effective technologies in the 
construction of housings), STEER (promotion of the use of biofuels and alternative energy 
resources in the field of transport), etc. (Morata and Solorio Sandoval 2012, pp. 82-85). 
Finally, an important part of the European Union’s measures within the framework 
of the European Union’s energy policy is played by the measures aimed at diversifying the 
sources of energy supplies. For instance, the European Union participates in the Energy 
Community of South East Europe (ECSEE) which involves countries beyond the EU, and 
is aimed to develop a common system of energy supplies for the entire European continent. 
The Baku Initiative promoted by the European Union involves the participation of the EU 
and countries with access to the Black and Caspian Seas. The Baku Initiative is aimed at 
promoting the supplies of energy resources from Asian countries to the European Union, 
with the involvement of littoral Caspian and Black Sea states as transit points. The 
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Initiative is aimed at limiting the level of dependence on Russian energy supplies 
(Kuzemko 2012, pp. 274-277). 
The Union for the Mediterranean includes the European Union member states and 
countries of North Africa, and is aimed at building up close partnership ties between the 
European Union and African countries in the field of energy production and supplies. 
Currently, the European Union plans to further develop this vector of cooperation in the 
energy sector, as African countries are seen as the EU’s potential major partners in the light 
of the EU’s energy policy aimed at the diversification of supply sources (Jacobs 2012, pp. 
101-102). 
The development of relations in the energy sector with Russia is run within the 
framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Such agreements mostly ensure 
continuous and uninterrupted supplies of natural gas and oil from Russia to the EU member 
states (Aalto 2008, pp. 79-80). As the relations between the European Union and Russia in 
the energy sector are crucial for the EU in terms of ensuring the Union’s energy security, 
they will be analyzed more deeply in the next chapters of this thesis. 
In the next chapter of the thesis, the role of the EU member states’ national 
governments in the implementation of the European Union’s common energy policy will be 
investigated more in detail. 
 
1.2 The role of governments in the European Energy Policy 
A particularly important issue in the field of implementation of the European 
Union’s common energy policy is the coordination of activities in the energy sector 
between the national governments of the EU member states. As it has already been stated in 
the previous chapter of this thesis, the legislative framework for the implementation of the 
European Union’s energy policy is currently implemented throughout all member states. 
Thus, the EU directives related to the field of energy are transposed to the national 
legislation of all EU member states, and the internal energy market rules are to be complied 
with by all EU member states. However, there are problems with the implementation of 
11	  
	  
common regulations, norms and standards, as there are significant differences in the 
legislation in force in different EU member states. Particularly, it is worth noting here that 
the formation of the energy mix, i.e. the structure of consumption of different types of 
energy in different EU member states belongs to the competences of such countries’ 
national authorities. This scheme is implemented for the purpose of optimizing the structure 
of energy consumption in all EU member states, and thus improving the overall level of 
energy security in the European Union (Pedersen, Behrens and Egenhofer 2008, pp. 54-55). 
First  of all, it should be noted that the agreements for energy supplies are entered 
into by each member state with foreign energy suppliers individually. Therefore, the terms 
and conditions of the supplies of natural gas, oil and other resources to different EU 
member states may significantly differ. As a result, the level of economic effectiveness of 
use of such resources differs as well for different EU member states, and their national 
governments may have different levels of interest in the compliance with the energy-
efficiency norms offered within the framework of the European Union’s energy policy 
(Welfens and Addison 2009, pp. 97-99). 
Next, it is worth noting that there is opposition within the European Union in terms 
of the different approaches to the cooperation with Russia in the energy sector. Lately, the 
issue of the construction of the so-called South Stream, a gas pipeline joining Russia and 
the European Union directly under the Black Sea and across the Balkans has been put into 
focus in the European Union (though it was cancelled in 2014 due to the Crimea Crisis and 
the tensions in the political relations between Russia and the European Union). While most 
EU member states oppose the implementation of the project in the light of Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and the aggression in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, 
and promote the construction of TANAP pipelines for the supplies of natural gas from 
Azerbaijan across the territory of Turkey, some EU countries still stress the importance of 
the cooperation with Russia. For instance, this is the case of Greece. Such an opposition 
between the European Union member states prevents the EU’s authorities from effectively 
implementing their strategy in the energy field in terms of the diversification of energy 
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supplies, and only further stresses the issues existing in the EU’s energy sector (Tosun, 
Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, pp. 227-230). 
Next, it should be understood that different EU member states have different 
standards and regulations in the field of energy and energy security. Due to such 
differences, companies of different European countries tend to adopt different approaches 
to energy security and energy effectiveness. Although the policies implement by the 
European Union in the field of maximum allowable emissions are among the most 
developed around the globe, subjects from less developed states have smaller financial 
resources, and therefore fail to comply with the norms recommended by the European 
Union (Kuzemko 2012, pp. 164-166). Moreover, there are different approaches in different 
EU member states to the development of alternative energy sources. This depends not only 
on the legislative base, but also on the climate conditions and availability of resources in 
different countries. For instance, Sweden largely focuses on the development of alternative 
energy, and its standards in this field significantly differ from the ones implemented within 
the framework of the European Union’s common energy policy. Thus, Swedish companies 
are subject to much stricter requirements in terms of energy efficiency and the use of 
alternative energy, and therefore the conditions of their work significantly differ from the 
rest of the EU member states (Jacobs 2012, pp. 202-205). 
However, despite the existing differences, member states of the European Union 
tend to closely cooperate in the energy sector for the purpose of developing mutual 
standards and achieving mutual goals with an ultimate aim of improving energy efficiency. 
For instance, all EU member states’ national governments tightly cooperate in the 
partnership programmes for research and development in the energy sector. Common 
budgets are formed for the development of projects in this field, and the results of such 
activities are implemented across all member states, thus contributing to the effective 
implementation of common energy policy norms in the European Union (Orbie 2008, pp. 
122-124). 
Also, all national governments tightly cooperate with foreign partners within 
initiatives such as the Baku Initiative or the Union for the Mediterranean. Thanks to those 
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mutual activities, the EU member states promote the implementation of the European 
Union’s common energy policy in the field of diversification of energy supplies and 
increase in the EU’s energy security (Talus 2013, pp. 174-175). 
Taking into account the importance of hydrocarbon imports from Russia, in the next 
chapter, the Russian Federation’s role for the European Union’s energy sector will be 
analyzed more in detail. 
 
1.3 The importance of Russian hydrocarbon exports for Europe 
When investigating the European Union member states’ dependence of the imports 
of energy resources from Russia, it is first of all worth understanding that the Russian 
Federation is one of the global leaders in terms of the volumes of proven oil and natural gas 
resources, their production and exports. Russia is abundant in energy resources, and has 
made this sphere its key factor of success in both economic relations and spreading of its 
geopolitical impact in the international level (Perović, Orttung and Wenger 2009, pp. 22-
23). 
As of today, Russia ranks 8th worldwide in terms of proven oil reserves, 1st in terms 
of oil production, and 2nd in terms of oil exports. At the same time, the country holds the 1st 
place on the global level by proven natural gas reserves, 2nd place by natural gas 
production, and 1st place by natural gas exports. Those figures testify that Russia is not only 
the region’s main producer of energy resources, but also a major supplier of such resources 
on the global scale (Aalto 2012, pp. 60-61). 
In recent years, the share of Russian imports of energy resources in the European 
Union has steadily remained at an average level of over 27%. At the same time, the share of 
Russian natural gas in the European Union’s aggregate natural gas imports has constantly 
remained at an average level of nearly 40% in recent years. The high values of hydrocarbon 
imports from the Russian Federation testify that the country’s supplies of energy resources 
play an utterly important role in the provision of the EU’s corporate sector and population 
with energy resources. However, at the same time, the great concentration of energy 
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supplies testifies high risks borne by the EU member states in terms of the possible 
stoppage of supplies from the Russian Federation. This is one of the main factors 
preconditioning the EU member states’ desire to diversify their sources of energy supplies, 
which has been described earlier in this thesis. Moreover, in this context, it is worth noting 
that the level of different EU member states’ dependence on the Russian Federation in 
terms of natural gas supplies differs, and some of those states are completely dependent on 
such supplies. This poses the energy security of the entire European Union under a major 
threat, and therefore the EU member states are forced to seek diversifying their sources of 
energy imports (Dellecker and Gomart 2011, pp. 113-115). 
The energy sector in the Russian Federation is monopolized by public enterprises. 
Thus, all gas supplies are fully controlled by the Russian state-owned gas corporation 
Gazprom, while all oil supplies are controlled by the state-owned giant Rosneft. As a result, 
when according the supplies of energy resources from the Russian Federation, the 
European Union member states have to agree upon all such terms and conditions with the 
Russian government, and not with private structures. On the one hand, this deprives the 
European Union of any possibility to seek better conditions of supply, prices, and so on. On 
the other hand, this also preconditions the utterly high dependence on Russia in geopolitical 
terms, as the Russian government may use energy supplies as a lever of tension in case of 
any political conflicts, being the sole beneficiary of all hydrocarbon supplies. At the same 
time, it should be noted on the other hand that the European Union is currently the major 
buyer of Russia’s energy resources, and the Russian Federation doesn’t have any effective 
switching alternatives at the moment, thus being dependent on the EU in terms of sales of 
natural gas  (Kuzemko 2012, pp. 77-81). 
An important aspect to be noted here is that all Russian supplies of natural gas to 
the European Union are made using the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline, the Nord 
Stream pipeline (offshore pipeline used for transporting natural gas), the Blue Stream 
pipeline (natural gas pipeline laid through the Black Sea and connecting the territory of the 
Russian Federation with Turkey), and the Yamal-Europe pipeline (connecting Russia with 
Germany through the territories of Belarus and Poland), and all oil supplies are made via 
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the Druzhba oil pipeline. There are no other gas and oil transportation pipelines connecting 
Russia and Western Europe. The projects planned for the construction of new pipelines are 
currently in progress, and there are significant political obstacles to their effective 
termination. The existing pipelines joining Russia and Western Europe all pass through the 
territory of Ukraine which lies between the Russian Federation and the EU. As a result, the 
EU is vulnerable to significant threats of interruption in the supplies of energy resources 
due to possible conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. This further deteriorates the 
European energy security, and makes the Union’s dependence on Russia’s energy supplies 
even greater. 
In addition to the abovementioned threat, it should be noted here that the Urengoy-
Pomary-Uzhgorod natural gas pipeline and the Druzhba oil pipeline are in fact the only 
pipelines existing between the European Union and countries of the Asian continent. 
Therefore, this means that there is no direct connection between the EU and those countries 
for transporting oil and natural gas. Countries of the Caspian Basin and other potential 
suppliers of energy resources to the European Union are thus forced to transport the energy 
resources produced on their territory via the Russian Federation. This implies the payment 
of fees for the use of pipelines laid through Russia’s territories, and preconditions the 
necessity to enter into agreements with the Russian Federation on the terms dictated by the 
country’s authorities (Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, pp. 197-199). 
Obviously, the information above definitely shows how much the European Union 
is currently dependent on Russia in terms of the imports of energy resources. The Russian 
Federation largely controls the supplies of natural gas and oil to the European Union, and 
has levers which may be used for interrupting those supplies, or for making them utterly 
ineffective in terms of the required financial expenses. This advantage provides Russia with 
an opportunity to use energy resources not only as an economic factor, but also as a major 
lever of geopolitical tension on the European Union (Orbie 2008, pp. 180-181). 
Taking into account the above information, it should be understood that the risks 
borne by the European Union in the context of its high dependence on energy supplies form 
the Russian Federation are very high. First of all, it is worth noting that as of today, the 
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EU’s major drawback in terms of the imports of energy resources is the lack of effective 
interconnections between different EU member states which would allow freely 
transporting natural gas within the Union. Another major drawback is connected with the 
circumstances described above: there are currently no pipelines for the transportation of 
energy resources laid beyond the territory of Russia. Therefore, the European Union’s 
alternatives are very scarce, and their ultimate effective implementation would require 
much time and substantial financial expenditures (Talus 2013, pp. 72-73). Taking into 
account the current situation in the relations between the European Union and Russia 
against the background of the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea and intervention 
in the Eastern regions of Ukraine after which the EU imposed significant sanctions against 
Russia and the Russian Federation struck back with similar measures, the risks inherent of 
the European Union’s high dependence on energy imports from Russia are only further 
growing, and their potential consequences are becoming more and more important. This is 
particularly true taking into consideration the fact that some of the European Union 
member states’ energy imports come from Russia in full, and therefore, in case of any 
interruption or stoppage of supplies, the entire economy of the EU would fall under a 
substantial threat (Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, pp. 204-206). 
As of today, the cooperation between Russia and the European Union in the energy 
sector is beneficial for both parties. For Russia, the European Union is a major sales 
market, where the largest portion of its natural gas and oil is supplied. For the European 
Union, the vast amounts of imports of natural gas and oil from the Russian Federation 
allow avoiding the need to enter into many agreements on different terms with different 
countries, as the volumes supplied by Russia couldn’t be effectively covered by any single 
exporter of energy resources (Pedersen, Behrens and Egenhofer 2008, p. 55). Moreover, the 
quality of energy resources supplied by Russia is high, and therefore the authorities of the 
European Union know well what product they purchase, and what opportunities it will 
bring. The use of other suppliers would mean additional adaptation to their standards, and 
probably additional processing of their products for satisfying the domestic needs of the EU 
member states (Proedrou 2011, pp. 90-92). 
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However, as it has already been said earlier, despite the current effectiveness of 
such cooperation with Russia in the energy field, the EU is subject to the effects of 
significant risks in terms of economic stability and energy security in terms of Russia’s 
high share in the European Union’s total imports of hydrocarbon. All such risks borne by 
the European can be conditionally divided into short-term and long-terms (Welfens and 
Addison 2009, pp. 36-37). 
The short-term risks incurred by the European Union in terms of its high 
dependence of energy imports from the Russian Federation include shortfalls of energy 
supplies which may be due to a great number of reasons. For instance, such shortfalls may 
be caused by the following issues: 
- technical issues with the pipelines, as both the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgood and 
Druzhba pipelines are old, and their particular sections beyond the territory of Russia 
require effective continuous maintenance, repairs and replacement. Moreover, the systems 
are technologically imperfect, and, for instance, in case of lack of the required pressure 
inside the pipelines, all supplies may be interrupted for some periods of time. In Western 
countries, those issues are eliminated thanks to the higher technological reliability of the 
energy supply networks (Kuzemko 2012, pp. 65-66); 
- theft of energy resources in the course of transportation. There have already many 
times been accusations on the part of Russia’s authorities of unauthorized use of gas 
transported via the territory of Ukraine. As the share of Russia’s exports is very high in the 
EU energy sector, all such thefts can lead to significant shortcomings of the volumes of 
energy resources required for the EU to fulfill the needs of its economy (Aalto 2008, pp. 
107-108); 
- terrorist attacks and other force-majeure events. Although those risks can’t be 
avoided with any supplies from any other countries, they are particularly high in the case of 
supplies from Russia. This is due to Russia’s very high share in the EU’s aggregate imports 




The long-term risks incurred by the European Union in terms of its high dependence 
on Russia’s energy exports can be conditionally divided into economic and geopolitical. 
Economic risks are as follows: 
- problems with the national economy. If the Russian Federation interrupts or stops 
its supplies of natural gas and oil to the European Union for any reason whatsoever, the EU 
will be likely to face significant difficulties with the provision of its economic sector with 
the required volume of energy resources. This is particularly important when speaking of 
developed EU member states, where the industrial sector requires continuous supplies of 
energy and electricity. As a result, this may lead to the overall recession in the European 
Union, growth in the actual rate of unemployment, and other negative cyclical conditions 
(Jacobs 2012, pp. 157-158); 
- problems with the social sector. Russia’s energy supplies are used by the European 
Union not only for ensuring the working capacity of its industrial sector, but also for 
satisfying the needs of the population. In case of any interruption or stoppage of supplies 
from the Russian Federation, the EU’ authorities will be likely to focus their attention on 
the steady operation of the industrial sector, and thus to divert part of the resources from the 
social sector. This would mean deterioration in the energy services provided to the 
population, and would probably mean rise in negative sentiment among the population. In 
its turn, such situation in the social sphere would lead to a substantial deterioration of the 
real economic sector as well (Morata and Solorio Sandoval 2012, pp. 139-142); 
- excessive expenditures for diversification. Taking into account the current lack of 
effective alternatives in terms of their practical applicability, in case of any deterioration of 
the relations with the Russian Federation in terms of energy imports from the country, the 
European Union will have to quickly seek alternatives for avoiding the deep recession of its 
economy. In that case, the EU will be forced to incur additional expenditures, as the delays 
for all works and conclusion of agreements will be very limited (Proedrou 2011, pp. 68-69). 
Political risks incurred by the European Union in those terms are as follows: 
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- political confrontation with Russia. The current opposition between the EU and 
the Russian Federation on the diplomatic level obviously leads to a substantial deterioration 
in the mutual relations between them. Therefore, there are significant threats that Russia 
would diminish or stop at all its energy supplies to the European Union. For the EU, this 
would mean the lack of opportunity to effectively satisfy the needs of the economic and 
social sectors (Welfens and Addison 2009, pp. 174-175); 
- confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. A major part of gas and oil transits 
from the Russian Federation to the European Union are run through the territory of 
Ukraine, there are significant risks that Ukraine would use its position as a transit country 
for putting tension on the EU against the background of its current conflict with Russia. In 
fact, if Ukraine stops transit of energy resources due to political considerations, there will 
be no other alternatives for supplying Russian gas and oil to the EU (Perović, Orttung and 
Wenger 2009, pp. 240-241); 
- Russia’s possible actions against diversification. Russia may use its geopolitical 
levers of tension for preventing other post-Soviet states which are potential major suppliers 
of energy resources to the European Union from running such supplies. Therefore, this may 
lead to an even further growth in the EU’s high dependence on Russia’s energy supplies 
(Morata and Solorio Sandoval 2012, pp. 104-105). 
 Having investigated the main aspects of the European Union’s energy policy, and 
the Russian Federation role’s in the supplies of energy resources to the EU, in the next 
chapter of this thesis, I would like to focus on Azerbaijan’ role for ensuring the effective 




2 Azerbaijan’s role in ensuring the EU’s energy security 
As the European Union’s dependence on energy imports from Russia is very high 
and the energy security policy of the EU clearly stipulates the need to seek diversification 
of energy supplies for avoiding excessive economic and political risks, the European Union 
has to seek effective alternatives in energy supplies which would allow increasing the 
overall level of its energy security, and thus would allow maintaining the political and 
economic stability of the European Union. One of the main alternatives considered by the 
EU’s authorities is the countries of the Caspian Basin, namely Azerbaijan. Therefore, they 
should be investigated more in detail as potential supplies of energy resources to the 
European Union. 
 
2.1 Azerbaijani energy security policies 
Azerbaijan’s traditions in the energy sector originated during the start of the 
country’s industrial development back in the late XIX century, and those traditions 
predefine the country’s current focus on the field of energy (Cornell 2011, pp. 59-60). 
Azerbaijan was economically important for both the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union. In times of the Russian Empire, Azerbaijan maintained the functioning of the entire 
Russian economy by providing it with oil. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s leading position in 
global oil production made it possible for the Russian Empire to rapidly develop its foreign 
economic relations. In the Soviet epoch, Azerbaijan’s economy functioned for the sake of 
the USSR, without any focus on foreign relations (Nichol 2008, pp. 18-19). 
In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Azerbaijan proclaimed its independence. 
The economy of Azerbaijan was not ready to face the new market conditions, just as the 
country’s legislation didn’t comply with the actual requirements of domestic development 
and foreign economic cooperation. As Azerbaijan didn’t have any major full-cycle 
industrial production, the country was unable to rapidly access foreign markets which had 
previously been restricted for the USSR. To the contrary, taking into consideration the 
circumstances objectively existing during that time, Azerbaijan remained to the largest 
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extent dependent on Russia (Ismailzade 2006, pp. 10-12). As the old connections between 
the ex-Soviet republics were ruptured, all countries faced the new geopolitical 
circumstances, being forced to change their domestic policies and vectors of foreign 
relations. Disputes arose between some of them for territories and geopolitical influence, 
due to which regional security became of utter importance on the entire post-Soviet space 
(Alieva, Lyutskanov and Seragimova 2013, pp. 50-51). 
The largest share of Azerbaijan’s exports and imports belonged to the trade with 
Russia. In addition to the economic dependence, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the proclamation of Azerbaijan’s independence, the country became a key point of Russia’s 
geopolitical interests in the South Caucasian region. Despite the end of the USSR’s 
existence, Russia continued positioning itself as a global superpower, and therefore 
preserving its influence on the post-Soviet space was one of Russia’s main geopolitical 
aspirations. At the same time, the region of South Caucasus was particularly important for 
Russia in geopolitical terms, as it linked Europe and Asia (Crandall 2006, pp. 175-177). 
As Azerbaijan was still economically and geopolitically much dependent on the 
Russian Federation, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the most active economic 
cooperation was carried out with Russia. Here, the interests of Russia and Azerbaijan 
coincided. Azerbaijan wished to rapidly modernize its oil-and-gas sector, while Russia, as 
the world’s major producer and exporter of oil and gas, was interested in entering the 
Azerbaijani energy market for several main purposes. On the one hand, Russia was 
interested in investing in the oil and gas production sector for the purpose of establishing 
control over it, and thus raising its energy companies’ share in global energy production 
(Gencer and Gerni 2012, pp. 127-128). On the other hand, Russia was interested in gaining 
access to the Azerbaijani oil and gas pipelines, namely the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum crude oil 
pipeline joining Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and thus providing access to oil supplies 
to Asia (this pipeline is directly linked with the Azerbaijani-Russian Baku-Novorossiysk 
pipeline), and the South Caucasus gas pipeline giving access to gas pipelines to Asia. In its 
turn, Azerbaijan was interested in getting additional investment in its energy sector from 
the Russian Federation, and in ensuring access to the European Union’s market of oil and 
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gas supplies through the mediation of Russia. Since that time, the field of oil and gas 
production has remained the core of Russia’s and Azerbaijan’s mutual cooperation (Cohen 
2014, pp. 293-296). 
However, a particularly important role in Azerbaijan’s development of its security 
policy was played by the 1994 Nagorno-Karabakh War against the self-proclaimed 
“Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” supported by Armenia. During the period of 1992 and 1993, 
Armenia has occupied 20 percent of the Azerbaijani territory. In the result of the Armenian 
aggression, the following seven regions have fallen under the occupation. Nearly million of 
people have become refugees and internally displaced persons. The area of the conflict was 
near Azerbaijan’s deposits of energy resources and gas and oil pipelines joining the country 
with Russia. Since the end of the war, Nagorno-Karabakh territory dominated by the 
separatist regime has remained the zone of frozen conflict, and the Russian Federation has 
been using its geopolitical levers for affecting both Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s vectors of 
geopolitical development (Luft and Korin 2009, pp. 115-117). 
Russia’s geopolitical policy in the South Caucasian region has gradually shifted 
toward the support of Armenia, and Azerbaijan started evaluating possible other 
alternatives for maintaining a high level of its national security. Yet again, the country’s 
energy sector was put into the core of those processes, as Azerbaijan started its deeper 
cooperation with Western countries through supplies of energy resources to them, and 
through the liberalization of the domestic energy market (Øverland, Kjærnet and Kendall-
Taylor 2010, pp. 110-111). 
As a result of complex political processes and negotiations with foreign partners, in 
2010, Azerbaijan officially proclaimed its course toward European integration, and rejected 
any scenarios of integration with the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
This was a turning point in the South Caucasian geopolitics, as Russia understood that it 
could completely lose its geopolitical influence over Azerbaijan (Diuk 2012, pp. 136-137). 
Azerbaijan hasn’t yet completed its European integration, as, according to the 
country’s officials, Azerbaijan’s economy is still too weak to open the country’s domestic 
market to powerful Western transnational corporations. Moreover, the European Union’s 
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requirements in both political and economic terms are not fully convenient for Azerbaijan, 
and therefore the country would like to suspend the negotiations on the association 
agreement with the EU, until all such issues are effectively resolved. Despite the fact that 
Azerbaijan only postponed negotiations on further European integration, without rejecting 
this idea as such, (De Jong, Auping and Govers 2014, pp. 288-292). 
As of today, Azerbaijan is playing a key role in the development of all processes in 
South Caucasus, and thus any Azerbaijan’s actions in the international arena to the largest 
extent affect not only regional security, but also the entire complex of relations between 
European and Asian countries. Due to this, Azerbaijan represents an essential geopolitical 
interest for both Western countries, namely the EU member states and the US, on the one 
hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand. The two global superpowers and their 
allies are trying to expand their spheres of influence, and the region of South Caucasus 
plays an utterly important role for each of them. Taking into consideration the 
aforementioned circumstances and Azerbaijan’s current non-aligned status, both Western 
and Russia-led structures are undertaking efforts in order to incline Azerbaijan to develop 
its security policy within the framework of their respective organizations. As of today, the 
possible scenarios of Azerbaijan’s security policy development can be conditionally 
divided into two main options: the European and Asian (Russian) ways (Aydın 2011, pp. 
170-172). 
Taking into account the high level of tensions made on Azerbaijan by the world’s 
major superpowers, the country has to pay significant attention to its national security. 
Here, the energy sector plays a predominant role for the country, as it makes the backbone 
of Azerbaijan’s economic development, and provides the country with the required 
resources for ensuring its growth. Thus, energy security is a key factor for maintaining not 
only Azerbaijan’s economic development, but also political stability (Aydın 2011, pp. 74-
75). 
In the field of energy security, the authorities of Azerbaijan tend to preserve the full 
control over the sector, as they believe it to be Azerbaijan’s strategic industry. Thus, the 
country’s energy sector is monopolized, and all operations related to the exploration, 
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production and sales of natural gas and oil are run by the government of Azerbaijan through 
its agencies. However, the country provides concessions to foreign companies for the 
participation in such operations. This is done for the purpose of giving a greater impetus to 
the Azerbaijani oil-and-gas sector, and to promote the imports of up-to-date energy sector 
technologies in the country. All foreign corporations’ activities are closely supervised and 
strictly controlled by the government of Azerbaijan in order not to let the deterioration of 
the energy sector, loss of control over it, and thus in order to prevent the emergence of 
major threats to the entire country’s political and economic stability (Luft and Korin 2009, 
pp. 263-266). 
 In the next chapter of the thesis, I would like to investigate more in detail the energy 
geopolitics of Azerbaijan, namely the country’s vectors of foreign relations aimed at 
developing its energy sector. 
 
2.2 Energy geopolitics of Azerbaijan 
When investigating the role of Azerbaijan’s energy sector in the country’s 
geopolitics, it is first of all worth noting that, from the very beginning of its independence 
period, the country started paying particular attention to the development of effective 
partnership ties with both Russia and the European Union based on energy supplies and the 
production of energy resources. Azerbaijan’s authorities understood that the energy sector 
provided the country with the largest inflows of monetary funds, and focused on its 
development. However, this was preconditioned not only by purely economic dividends, 
but also by geopolitical interests (Alieva, Lyutskanov and Seragimova 2013, pp. 73-74). 
For the Azerbaijani authorities, the development of the energy sector became a great 
opportunity to influence both the decisions of Russia and Western countries on the 
international diplomatic level for a peaceful solution, namely in the context of Azerbaijan’s 
protracted conflict with Armenia over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, in the 
context of its relations with Russia, Azerbaijan’s energy sector represents a major factor of 
interest to both countries. Thus, on the one hand, Russia is interested in Azerbaijan as a 
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country linking it with the Central Asian states. The pipelines laid through Azerbaijan’s 
territory are used by the Russian Federation for supplying its natural gas and oil to Asia, 
and therefore the development of relations with Azerbaijan in the energy sector is of a 
strategic importance to Russia. On the other hand, Russia isn’t interested in Azerbaijan’s 
close cooperation with Western countries in terms of the supplies of energy resources due 
to the fact that this may bring significant financial damages to the Russian Federation, as 
Azerbaijan could potentially substitute part of the EU’s imports of energy resources from 
the Russian Federation (Crandall 2006, pp. 127-128). 
For the European Union, the close cooperation with Azerbaijan in the energy sector 
provides an opportunity to effectively diversify the sources of energy supplies, and thus to 
avoid the excessive dependence on the Russian Federation in those terms. Therefore, the 
EU member states tend not only to cooperate with Azerbaijan in the energy sector, but also 
to provide the country with investments required to boost its economic development with 
this aim (Diuk 2012, pp. 167-168). 
Therefore, thanks to its energy sector, Azerbaijan represents a major object of interest 
to both Russia and Western countries. This allows the country using its energy sector as a 
key competitive advantage in its geopolitics. Azerbaijan’s authorities may effectively use 
the country’s energy sector for imposing their economic and political conditions on the 
Russian Federation and the European Union for maximizing the benefits obtained through 
cooperation with them. In this context, it is particularly worth noting that Azerbaijan 
currently refrains from entering any integration formations, and tries to develop its 
cooperation with all partners with a particular emphasis on the energy sector (Aydın 2011, 
pp. 130-133). 
The relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union in the energy sector 
started back in 1994, i.e. on the initial stage of Azerbaijan’s economic formation after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1994, Azerbaijan and its Western partners entered into 
Azeri, Chirag and deep-water Gunashli (ACG)-International Contract No. 1 commonly 
referred to as the Contract of the Century due to its large scale and the benefits brought to 
the Azerbaijani national economy. Under the Contract of the Century, the authorities of 
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Azerbaijan ran a vast liberalization of the country’s domestic oil-and-gas market, and 
provided foreign corporations with concessions for exploring and producing oil and natural 
gas on the country’s territory (Øverland, Kjærnet and Kendall-Taylor 2010, pp. 43-44). The 
agreement was signed with major Western corporations involved in the energy sector. 
Those corporations and the Azerbaijani state-owned oil-and-gas monopolist established an 
energy consortium aimed to effectively develop the country’s energy sector (Nichol 2008, 
pp. 49-50). 
Thanks to the conclusion of the Contract of the century, Azerbaijan created a 
completely new vector of its foreign relations representing an effective alternative to the 
cooperation with Russia within the framework of international organizations established 
under its auspices. At the same time, it is worth noting here that, despite allowing foreign 
corporations entering its energy market, the Azerbaijani authorities preserved the full 
control over it for the purpose of not losing the country’s geopolitical sovereignty and 
economic stability. This was a key prerequisite for the subsequent effective geopolitical 
development of Azerbaijan (Diuk 2012, pp. 180-181). 
After entering into the Contract of the Century, Azerbaijan significantly boosted the 
development of its cooperation with Western countries in the energy sector. Thereafter, 
Azerbaijan officially joined the European Union’s INOGATE programme destined to 
promote the improvement of the EU’s energy security. Within the framework of this 
programme, Azerbaijan obtained significant financial investments on the part of the 
European Union, and was able to improve the technological development of its energy 
sector thanks to the close cooperation with the EU member states. By entering this 
programme, Azerbaijan further used the energy sector as its key factor of geopolitical 
development, as the country significantly raised the level of cooperation with the European 
countries through the oil-and-gas sector (Ismailzade 2006, pp. 53-54). 
In 2003, Azerbaijan started implementing the construction of the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) for the transportation of natural gas to the European Union via the territory 
of the Balkans, avoiding the transit via the territory of the Russian Federation. The project 
was launched in close cooperation with the European Union member states. Later, in 2013, 
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another new project was launched in this field. Azerbaijan started the construction of the 
Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) which was another major pipeline for the 
transportation of natural gas from the country to the European Union. Similarly to TAP, 
TANAP aims to supply natural gas to the EU beyond the territory of Russia, this time via 
Turkey. The financial and engineering support for the construction of both pipelines was 
provided by the European Union, and this again showed the importance of the Azerbaijani 
oil-and-gas sector for the development of its foreign relations, and thus for the maintenance 
and further improvement of its regional geopolitical status (De Jong, Auping and Govers 
2014, pp. 124-126). 
Thus, it can obviously be stated that the development of Azerbaijan as a major 
manufacturer and supplier of energy resources largely predefines the country’s geopolitical 
growth vectors, and the energy sector is a key factor of the country’s geopolitical stability. 
In the next section of the thesis, I would like to investigate more in detail the strategic 
importance of the Caspian Basin countries for the European Union’s energy security. 
 
2.3 Importance of the Caspian Basin for the EU’s energy security 
 When investigating the importance of the Caspian Basin countries for the European 
Union’s energy security, it is first of all worth understanding that, according to recent 
estimates, countries of that region are among the world's states most abundant in oil and gas 
deposits. Although they lag behind the Middle Eastern states in terms of the estimated 
reserves of energy resources and particularly in terms of the current level of their 
production, the Caspian Basin states have great prospects for the development of the energy 
sector in the future, and their existing opportunities aren't used in full as of today. Taking 
into consideration the abundance of the Caspian Basin states, namely of Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, in energy resources, they are prospective major 
suppliers of oil and natural gas to the European Union, which is particularly important in 
the light of the EU’s policies aimed for the diversification of oil and natural gas supplies 




Figure 1. Projected production of oil in the Caspian Basin countries, in Mt (Mez 2010, p. 12) 
 




As Figures 1 and 2 above illustrate, the projected growth of oil and natural gas 
production in the Caspian Basin countries is expected to constantly grow until 2020, with 
the most rapid growth pace in countries which are currently less powerful in terms of the 
production of energy resources as compared with Russia. The charts above testify that the 
overall production of energy resources in the Caspian Basin will tend to grow in the future, 
and this means that the export potential of those states will continue growing as well. This 
largely predefines the European Union’s interest in developing cooperation with the 
Caspian Basin countries in the field of energy, as they will be able to provide greater 
volumes of energy supplies to the EU, and thus to satisfy the European Union’s greater 
needs in oil and natural gas. 
 Historically, the cooperation between the European Union and the Caspian Basin 
countries in the field of energy security started back in 1991, right after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. In the conditions of the rapid liberalization of the post-Soviet countries’ 
domestic markets, the authorities of the European countries wanted to establish strong 
partnership ties with the newly formed countries on the territory of the ex-USSR, namely 
with an aim of ensuring higher energy security. The first program which touched upon 
those issues was TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States). Within the framework of TACIS, the EU in particular aimed to deepen its 
cooperation with the Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the field of energy 
supplies. This program also gave an impetus for the development and implementation of 
TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) aimed at linking European 
countries with Central Asian states through the Black Sea and the Caspian Basin region 
(Pedersen, Behrens and Egenhofer 2008, pp. 43-44). 
Another important program which was implemented by the European Union in the 
early 1990’s with an aim to develop its cooperation with the Caspian Basin countries was 
INOGATE. Under INOGATE, the EU aimed to deepen its cooperation with the countries 
of the Black Sea and the Caspian Basin in the energy sector. Namely, within the framework 
of INOGATE, the European Union undertook to provide large-scale investment to the 
Caspian Basin countries in exchange for the future supplies of energy resources from them 
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produced with the use of the funds granted by the EU. This program promoted the rapid 
development of the European Union’s relations with the Caspian Basin countries, and 
established strong grounds for their subsequent development. INOGATE is still valid as of 
today, and makes an integral part of the European Union’s policies in the field of energy 
security (Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, pp. 144-145). 
Another important point in the development of relations in the energy sector 
between the European Union and the Caspian Basin countries is the European 
Neighborhood Policies used as the framework for the development of the EU’s partnership 
ties with other countries beyond the Union. An integral part of the ENPs is constituted by 
the development of ties aimed at increasing the level of energy security (Proedrou 2011, pp. 
127-128). 
However, although the legislative frameworks and programs described above play 
an important role in the development of the European Union’s cooperation with the 
Caspian Basin states in the field of energy security, as of today, the legislative basis 
available is insufficient for the effective promotion of such partnership ties, and this is one 
of the key issues in the development of the European Union’s common energy policy, as 
has already been described earlier in this thesis (Dellecker and Gomart 2011, p. 160). 
In recent years, the development of cooperation between the European Union and 
the Caspian Basin countries in the energy sector has been greatly boosted by the 
implementation of projects related to the construction of oil and gas pipelines connecting 
the European Union’s countries with the states of Central Asia. Such projects make part of 
the European Union’s policies implemented in the energy sector, and are expected to play 
an essential role in the EU member states’ search for alternative sources of energy supplies 
(Talus 2013, pp. 186-187). 
Taking into account the abovementioned information, it can be stated that the 
Caspian Basin countries represent a major interest for the EU member states against the 
background of the European Union’s policies aimed at diversifying the sources of supply of 
energy resources, and thus at decreasing the share of the Russian Federation in the imports 
of oil and natural gas. In the next chapter of the thesis, particular attention will be paid to 
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the implementation of projects in the energy sector involving the European Union and 
Azerbaijan, and to the role which may be played by those projects in the future deepening 
of economic cooperation between them. 
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3 Projects implemented by the European Union and 
Azerbaijan in the energy sector, and their role in the 
provision of the EU’s energy security 
3.1 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is the second longest oil pipeline running through 
the territory of the post-Soviet countries, after the Druzhba pipeline. The BTC pipeline 
lies between the city of Baku and the Turkish port town Ceyhan, and all supplies of oil run 
through it are delivered via the territory of Georgia, namely its capital city Tbilisi. The 
resource supplied via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is the crude oil produced in the 
Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea shelf. This pipeline plays an essential 
role in the development of Azerbaijan’s relations with the European Union in the energy, 
and it is worth looking more in detail at the history of the implementation of this project in 
order to understand its importance (Pedersen, Behrens and Egenhofer 2008, p. 43). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of the Caspian Basin were 
deprived of their own pipelines for transporting energy resources to European states, as all 
such pipelines went through the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore 
countries of the Caspian Basin were forced to pay transit fees to Russia, and moreover 
were vulnerable to Russia’s own geopolitical interests and ambitions which overlapped 
with the country’s activities run in the energy sector. Therefore, in those conditions, a key 
step in the energy field for countries of the Caspian Basin, and namely for Azerbaijan, was 
the construction of a separate pipeline connecting the Caspian Basin with European states. 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was such project developed by the Azerbaijani authorities 
(Aalto 2008, pp. 134-136). 
The options for the construction of the pipeline initially included the transitional 
laying through either Armenia or Georgia. However, the variant with Armenia was in the 
long run rejected due to the protracted and unresolved conflict between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the long-run, after negotiations on the 
highest level between the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan, the two states agreed to 
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run the pipeline via the territory of Georgia. In 1993, a preliminary agreement was entered 
into by the governments of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia. However, the construction of 
the pipeline started only in 2002 (Morata and Solorio Sandoval 2012, pp, 77-79). 
The effective implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project 
became possible thanks to the experience obtained by Azerbaijan through the cooperation 
with Western countries in the energy sector within the framework of the so-called 
Contract of the Century described earlier in this thesis. Thus, the pipeline was constructed 
with the involvement of major transnational corporations from around the globe with 
extensive experience in the energy field. Azerbaijan again participated in the agreement 
being represented by SOCAR, the Azerbaijani energy market monopolist. The pipeline 
was put into operation only in 2005, and has since then remained an important means of 
oil transportation in the region (Welfens and Addison 2009, p. 73). 
 
 
Figure 3. Structure of ownership in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, as of 2014 (Tosun, 



















As can be seen from Figure 3 above, as of today, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline is partially owned by major oil-and-gas companies such as British Petroleum 
(30.1%), Chevron (8.9%), Statoil (8.71%), etc. At the same time, SOCAR holds the title 
of ownership for 25%, one of the major shares. This testifies that the Azerbaijani 
government was able to raise significant investment in the construction project, but still 
has a high level of control over the pipeline, and thus has overall great levers for the 
control over the domestic energy market. At the same time, the interest of Western 
European, America and Asian companies in the development of the Azerbaijani oil-and-
gas sector further proves the country’s importance as a supplier of energy resources, 
particularly for the European Union. 
The operation of the pipeline is important for Azerbaijan in economic terms, as it 
currently allows transporting nearly 30 million tons of oil produced in Azerbaijan. Turkey 
and Georgia get significant benefits in the form of transit fees. In the near future, there are 
plans to further expand the pipeline for the purpose of linking it directly with the countries 
of Southern Europe, and thus for further increasing the level of benefits obtained by the 
Azerbaijani government. For the European Union, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is 
much important in terms of the diversification of its oil imports, and the projects for the 
subsequent expansion of the pipeline are discussed on the highest level within the EU. For 
proving the above statement, it should be noted that as of 2013, the EU imported 
approximately 13 million barrels of crude oil every day, while the daily volume of oil 
discharged from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline makes up slightly less than 1 billion 
barrels of crude oil daily, which corresponds to approximately 7.7% of the European 
Union’s total crude oil imports (Alieva, Lyutskanov and Seragimova 2013, pp. 76-77). 
In the next chapter, another important oil pipeline of Azerbaijan, namely the Baku-




3.2 Baku-Supsa oil pipeline 
The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline links two countries of the South Caucasian region, 
namely Azerbaijan and Georgia. The pipeline is laid from the Sangachal terminal to the 
city of Supsa in Georgia. This pipeline lies to the north of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, and doesn’t have any intermediary transit points. The partners operating the 
pipeline include the UK-based major transnational energy corporation British Petroleum 
and the Azerbaijan State oil company SOCAR. The Baku-Supsa Oil Pipeline is also 
commonly referred to as the Western Route Export Pipeline (Kuzemko 2012, pp. 223-
224). 
The preliminary agreement for the construction of the pipeline was entered into by 
the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1994, and the construction and assembly 
works started in 1996. Already in 1999, the pipeline was put into operation. The greatest 
part of investments required for the implementation of the project were provided by the 
British investors, and this helped significantly accelerate the construction process. As of 
today, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline is able to transport nearly 150,000 barrels of oil per 
day, and there are plans for the subsequent improvement of its capacities in the future 
(Diuk 2012, pp. 170-171). 
The importance of the pipeline for Azerbaijan lies in the fact that it provides the 
country with an opportunity to deliver oil resources directly to Georgia, and thus to have a 
direct access to the Black Sea from where oil can be delivered to Bulgaria and Romania 
via water transport. Thus, it can obviously be stated that the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline 
provides Azerbaijan with two strategic alternatives. On the one hand, thanks to the 
pipeline, Azerbaijan is able to maintain its leading positions in the region’s energy sector, 
and thus is able to get significant financial benefits. On the other hand, the operation of the 
pipeline provides the Azerbaijani authorities with an opportunity to supply oil to member 
states of the European Union without any transit via the territory of Russia (Crandall 
2006, pp. 212-213). 
When speaking of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline’s importance for the European 
Union, as of today, it can be stated that the volumes of oil transported by sea transport are 
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low, as this is not cost-effective. However, in the near future, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline 
may be used for developing the pipeline infrastructure to link Azerbaijan and the 
European Union member states. For instance, in the future, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline 
may be extended and coupled with an underwater pipeline connecting Azerbaijan and the 
EU member states via the territory of Georgia. This would allow the EU diversifying its 
energy supplies, and also significantly reducing the expenses for the Azerbaijani oil (Talus 
2013, pp. 198-200). 
In the next chapter, the AGRI project for the supplies of natural gas from 
Azerbaijan to Romania will be investigated. 
 
3.3 AGRI 
Taking into account the information mentioned above, it should be noted that 
Azerbaijan and the European Union largely cooperate no only in the field of oil 
transportations, but also in gas transportations. The problems faced here are the same as in 
the oil sector. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan lost its effective 
infrastructural communications with the other countries of the ex-Soviet Union, and as of 
today, all gas supplies are run via the territory of the Russian Federation. This 
significantly impairs the economic benefits gained by Azerbaijan, and at the same time 
deprives the country of the opportunity to effectively satisfy the needs of the European 
Union in natural gas. Therefore, a key issues relevant as of today in the field of 
Azerbaijan’s gas supplies to the European Union is the construction of a pipeline which 
would link it directly with the EU (De Jong, Auping and Govers 2014, pp. 122-124). 
One of the major currently discusses between Azerbaijan and the European Union 
in the field of gas supplies is the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania Interconnector (AGRI). 
AGRI is a projected gas pipeline for the transportation of natural gas Sangachal Terminal 
in Azerbaijan to the Black Sea border in Georgia, and there after to Romania, from where 
such natural gas supplied would be redistributed to other Central European states making 
part of the European Union. The project assumes that a liquefied natural gas terminal 
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would be built in Georgia, where the natural gas supplied from Azerbaijan would be 
liquefied and loaded to sea vessels which would transport it to Romania. This method of 
natural gas transportation is cost-effective, and it would allow Azerbaijan avoiding the 
transit through Russia (Proedrou 2011, pp. 139-140). 
The expected capacity of the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania Interconnector 
amounts to 7 billion m3 of natural gas per year, of which approximately 30% would be 
supplied directly to Romania. Therefore, the construction of the Azerbaijan–Georgia–
Romania Interconnector would allow the European Union diversifying part of its natural 
gas imports through the natural gas produced in the deposits of Azerbaijan (Cornell 2011, 
p. 86). 
The preliminary agreement between the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Romania for the construction of the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania Interconnector was 
signed in 2010, and it is currently expected that the project will be delivered by the public 
oil-and-gas corporations of the three countries. However, taking into account the fact that 
the expected amount of investment in the project makes up approximately EUR 6 billion, 
it is possible that investors would be attracted for effectively financing the project. Also, 
Bulgaria currently investigates the opportunities of joining the project, as the country 
could effectively host a degasification terminal similar to the one planned for construction 
in Romania. However, as of today, the participation of Bulgaria is yet to be discussed 
(Talus 2013, p. 307). 
In the next chapter, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline for the supplies of natural gas from 
Azerbaijan to the European Union will be investigated. 
 
3.4 TAP 
The project of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline is one of the major projects in the energy 
sector currently implemented by Azerbaijan and the European Union. The Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline is a gas pipeline for the transportation of natural gas from Azerbaijan via Greece 
and Albania to Italy, and then to other Western European countries. The implementation 
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of the project started in 2015, and it is expected to be put into operation in 2018. The 
pipeline’s planned capacity amounts to up to 20 billion m3 of natural gas per year.  
 
 
Figure 4. Structure of ownership in the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project (Karagiannis 2013, p. 151) 
 
 As can be seen from Figure 4 above, the structure of investment and ownership in 
the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project is similar to the structure of ownership in other mutual 
projects in the energy sector between Azerbaijan and the European Union. Thus, the 
project is mostly financed through the investments of major Western European 
corporations, namely the British giant British Petroleum, and the Norwegian energy 
corporation Statoil, but with the Azerbaijani State Oil company SOCAR holding the 
largest share on equal conditions with the two aforementioned corporations. The 
participation of the major global oil-and-gas companies testifies the importance of the 
TAP project for the European Union. 
 Initially, the TAP project was launched back in 2003, and it assumed two different 
routes which could be used for laying the pipeline, namely the one used as of today, and 

















to its lower cost-effectiveness. In 2008, a joint venture was established between the 
companies given in Figure 4 above, and works were launched for the detailed 
investigation of the feasibility of the project. In 2009, the governments of Italy, Albania 
and Greece officially joined the agreement for the construction of the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline with Azerbaijan, and declared that the project fitted best the energy security goals 
pursued by the European Union. The construction works started in 2015, and the 
commissioning is expected to take place in 2018 (Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, 
pp. 83-84). 
 The Trans Adriatic Pipeline project is much important for both Azerbaijan and the 
European Union, as it would allow the country transporting its natural gas to the European 
Union directly, without anyhow depending on the transit routes laid via the territory of the 
Russian Federation. The particular importance of the pipeline consists in the fact that it is 
expected to transport the natural gas extracted from the Shah Deniz gas deposit, 
Azerbaijan’s largest source of natural gas production. The planned capacity of 20 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas per year would allows significantly divesrsifying the European 
Union’s energy imports, and thus reducing the EU’s dependence on the Russian natural 
gas (Kuzemko 2012, pp. 260-262). 
 Another important feature of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline is the fact that this project 
is closely interlinked with the TANAP project for the construction of the Trans-Anatolian 
Natural Gas Pipeline, another major international project aimed at linking the Shah Deniz 
field in Azerbaijan with the consumers of natural gas in the European Union. The 
implementation of the two projects would allow creating a developed natural gas 
transportation infrastructure between Azerbaijan and the European Union, and this would 
allow significantly reducing the European Union’s dependence on the supplies of natural 
gas from the Russian Federation (Perović, Orttung and Wenger 2009, pp. 148-149). 
 The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline project and its importance for the 
effective development of relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union in the 





The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project assumes the 
construction of a natural gas pipeline which would link the Shah Deniz gas field in 
Azerbaijan with Georgia and Turkey. From Turkey, the pipeline is expected to go further 
to the territory of Greece and Albania, where it would be connected with the Trans 
Adriatic pipeline. Thus, as can be seen, the scope of the project if very large, and its 
implementation should provide Azerbaijan with key strategic opportunities in terms of not 
only supplies of energy resources to the member states of the European Union, but also in 
terms of the country’s share in the energy market of Central Asia. The construction works 
started in 2015, and the pipeline is expected to be put into operation by 2018, just as in the 




Figure 5. Structure of ownership in the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline project (Karagiannis 















 As can be seen from Figure 5 above, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline 
only has three owners, and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan holds the controlling 
interest in the project, having the title for 58% of the shares. The two other companies are 
the British giant British Petroleum and the Turkish state monopolist BOTUS Petroleum 
Pipeline Corporation. 
 The project was initially proposed in 2011, and the governments of Azerbaijan and 
Turkey entered into a preliminary agreement for the construction and operation of the gas 
pipeline, and the aforementioned consortium of companies was established. In 2012, the 
development of the project was finished, and the final agreement was signed between the 
countries involved. The construction works started in 2015, and are performed by major 
Western European construction corporations. The project is planned to be commissioned 
in 2018 (Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, p. 238). 
 The estimated total cost of the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas 
Pipeline amounts to nearly EUR 9 billion, and the planned capacity of the pipeline makes 
up 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Thus, together with the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline, TANAP is expected to provide Azerbaijan with the ability to transport 
approximately 36 billion cubic meters of natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field 
directly to the European countries. Moreover, further expansion of capacities is possible, 
up to 26 billion cubic meters for TANAP, and up to 30 billion cubic meters for TAP (Diuk 
2012, pp. 105-106). The current capacity of the Shah Deniz gas field which is the source 
for natural gas supplies via TAP and TANAP is estimated to make up approximately 
1,200 billion cubic meters of natural gas. At the expected amounts of gas transportations 
via the above pipelines, the total lifespan of the Shah Deniz field would make up to 30 
years (Upstream Online Website 2013, Socar tallies up giant Umid field). 
 Thus, the project of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline is much attractive 
for both Azerbaijan and the European Union. For Azerbaijan, it would allow effectively 
operating the giant Shah Deniz natural gas field, and transporting the gas extracted from 
the deposit directly to both the European Union and Central Asian countries, namely 
Turkey. This would significantly increase the benefits generated by Azerbaijan. At the 
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same time, for the European Union, this would allow drastically reducing the energy 
dependence on Russia, and would provide the EU member states with an opportunity to 
significantly diversify the sources of their natural gas imports (Morata and Solorio 
Sandoval 2012, p. 165). 
Also, there is a project aimed to construct an underwater natural gas transportation 
pipeline between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline), and to link 
into to the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline. This project would provide the 
European Union with even greater opportunities to raise its energy security, as the Trans-
Caspian Gas Pipeline would allow importing natural gas not only from Azerbaijan, but 
also from Turkmenistan, using the already existing infrastructural capacities. However, 
this project hasn’t yet been put into operation due to the unresolved dispute over the 
establishment of territorial boundaries in the Caspian Sea, and due to the ensuing conflicts 
between the countries involved in it (Jacobs 2012, pp. 239-240). 
In the next chapter, the Nabucco natural gas pipeline construction project will be 
investigated more in detail. 
 
3.6 Nabucco 
The Nabucco natural gas pipeline construction project is a projected pipeline for 
the supplies of natural gas to link Turkey and Austria. Although the Nabucco pipeline 
isn’t expected to be laid directly through the territory of the Caspian Basin countries, 
under the project proposed, it would be linked with the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline, and 
therefore the main source of gas supplies through the Nabucco pipeline would be the Shah 
Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan. There are also alternative supply routes which are currently 
planned within the framework of the Nabucco project. For instance, in addition to the 
Azerbaijani natural gas, the governments involved in the project see Turkmenistan and 




The consortium responsible for the development of the project includes the 
following oil-and-gas sector corporations: BOTAŞ (Turkey), BEH (Bulgaria), FGSZ 
(Hungary), OMV (Asutria), and Transgaz (Romania). It was established in 2002, when 
negotiations between the governments of the countries involved took off. In 2003, the 
European Union financed half of the costs associated with the investigation of the real 
opportunities for the implementation of the Nabucco project. Azerbaijan was officially 
involved in the project in 2008, when the participating partners decided that the 
Azerbaijani natural gas would be the most beneficial source of natural gas supplies to the 
European Union via the Nabucco pipeline. In 2010, all countries participating in the 
project ratified an intergovernmental agreement for the construction and the subsequent 
operation of the Nabucco pipeline, which testified the importance of the project for all 
stakeholders involved, particularly for the European Union member states. In 2012, an 
agreement with the Shah Deniz consortium was signed for the funding and operation of 
the Nabucco project. However, in 2013, the Shah Deniz Consortium opted toward the 
Trans Adriatic Pipeline construction project, and therefore, as of today, the future of the 
Nabucco pipeline construction project remains rather unclear. The projected start of 
construction works is the year 2018, but further prospects of the project will largely 
depend on the discovery of new deposits and growth in the production capacities in 
Azerbaijan, and on the implementation of other natural gas pipeline construction projects 
in the region (Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, pp. 159-162). 
The expected initial capacity of the Nabucco natural gas transportation pipeline 
would amount to 10 billion cubic meters of gas, with the possibility of expanding this 
volume up to 23 billion cubic meters from the Shah Deniz field. Moreover, additional 10 
billion cubic meters of natural gas per year could be transported from Turkmenistan, 
namely through the planned Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline to be coupled with the 
Nabucco pipeline. Finally, up to 5.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year could be 
transported from Egypt, via the Arab Gas Pipeline to be interlinked with the Nabucco 
natural gas pipeline. Therefore, the expected capacities of the project are very large, and 
they could prospectively help significantly diversify the European Union’s sources of 
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natural gas imports, and decrease the Russian Federation’s share in the supplies of natural 
gas (Talus 2013, pp. 267-268). 
For Azerbaijan, the Nabucco pipeline construction project is potentially much 
beneficial in economic terms, as it would allow the country generating additional profits 
through the supplies of natural gas to the European Union without the transit through the 
territory of Russia. For the EU, in addition to diversifying the supplies of natural gas, the 
Nabucco project would represent another key advantage. In contrast to all other similar 
projects, the Nabucco pipeline is expected to link the Caspian Sea basin and Western 
Europe directly, without the transit via Southern Europe. Therefore, the implementation of 
this project would allow significantly improving the structure of supplies, and reducing 
the costs of re-distribution of natural gas from the supplies performed to Southern Europe. 
In its turn, this would help significantly increase the energy security of the European 
Union. 
In the next chapter, the SOCAR-DESPA project will be investigated. 
 
3.7 SOCAR-DESFA 
A major project currently planned by the State Oil Corporation of Azerbaijan is the 
purchase of controlling interest in the Greek monopolist of the electricity distribution 
networks DESFA. DESFA is a subsidiary of the Greek gas distribution company DEPA 
which is currently put on sale. The tender for the privatization of DESFA organized by the 
Greek authorities currently involves three main competitors: SOCAR, the Greek company 
GEK Terna, and the Russian state giant Gazprom. The latter competes at once for 
purchasing not only DESPA, but also DEPA. Gazprom has better opportunities for 
acquiring the company taking into account the company’s financial resources, but SOCAR 
sees this deal as a key step for the development of the Azerbaijani energy sector, and 
therefore intensively offers development projects to the Greek government, in order to win 
the tender (Talus 2013, pp. 236-237). 
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The acquisition of DESFA is prospectively very beneficial for the State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan due to a number of reasons. Thus, it should be understood that the 
production of power and electricity in Greece relies on the natural gas, as most power 
plants in the country function either on natural gas or on hydropower. Taking into account 
the projects currently implemented by Azerbaijan and the European Union for 
constructing natural gas pipelines linking Azerbaijan and Greece (namely the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline, and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline), Azerbaijan  could 
become the major supplier of natural gas to Greece already in the near future. Therefore, 
for the Azerbaijani authorities, operating the Greek monopolist of the electricity 
distribution networks functioning almost entirely on the Azerbaijani natural gas would 
allow obtaining significant economic benefits taking into consideration the economies of 
scale achieved within the framework of those projects. For Greece, SOCAR’s winning bid 
would mean higher effectiveness in the operation of the power distribution networks, and 
probably lower prices for electricity for the population. In contrast to the Russian natural 
gas currently being the main source of supplies of natural gas to Greece, the Azerbaijani 
gas would be supplied to Greece directly, which would allow avoiding superfluous costs. 
Furthermore, the operation of the Greek electricity distribution networks by the same 
corporation would mean higher management effectiveness, as the professionals of 
SOCAR are fully aware of the parameters of the natural gas supplied, its refinement and 
use in the electricity generation processes, etc. (Tosun, Biesenbender and Schulze 2015, 
pp. 153-154). 
For the European Union, Azerbaijan’s acquisition of the Greek electricity 
distribution monopolist DESFA together with the implementation of the TAP and TANAP 
natural gas pipeline construction projects would bring two key advantages. On the one 
hand, the EU would thus be able to significantly diversify its sources of energy imports, 
thus reducing its dependence on Russia and increasing the overall level of energy security. 
On the other hand, the effective operation of the Greek electricity distribution networks by 
the State Oil Corporation of Azerbaijan would prospectively allow resolving the energy 
issues in Greece, and at the same time exporting part of the energy generated to other 
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Southern European states, which would contribute to the overall resolution of the energy 
crisis in the European Union. 
Having analyzed the main projects and aspects of cooperation between Azerbaijan 
and the European Union in the energy sector, in the next chapter, conclusions will be 






4 Analysis of the research findings 
The findings of the research prove that as of today, countries of the Caspian Basin, 
and namely Azerbaijan, play a key role for the European Union in terms of the common 
energy policy implemented by the EU member states. This is preconditioned by many 
factors, in particular by the lack of effective diversification of natural gas and crude oil 
supply sources existing in the European Union as of today. The utterly high level of the 
EU’s dependence on the Russian Federation is a major factor predefining the opportunities 
for the effective cooperation between the European Union and Azerbaijan in the energy 
sector. 
The European Union’s and Azerbaijan’s mutual interests in the development of 
cooperation in the energy sector are proven by the great number of mutual projects 
currently implemented or planned by the two states. As can be seen from the previous 
chapter of the research, only the capacities of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan and 
the TAP and TANAP pipeline construction projects can help significantly diversify the 
sources of natural gas imports in the European Union, with their capacity in aggregate 
constituting approximately 8% of the current total gas imports required by the EU. Other 
major projects in the energy sector such as Nabucco or the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania 
Interconnector further prove that Azerbaijan is a prospective major partner of the 
European Union in terms of energy supplies, as most major projects implemented by the 
EU in the energy sector are directed to the countries of the Caspian Basin, and namely to 
Azerbaijan. 
In the course of the research, several hypotheses have been tested. 
 
H1: Lack of alternatives in energy supplies may lead to unfair pricing. 
Hypothesis 1 has been confirmed. Indeed, as the practice shows, namely in terms 
of the European Union’s relations with the Russian Federation in the energy sector, the 
lack of alternative supply sources may lead to an ever-growing dependence on a particular 
supplier, and as a result to its unfair practices in the establishment of prices for the 
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products supplied. This is preconditioned by the general market laws, and this conclusion 
is relevant for all industries. The monopolization of the market most often leads to the fact 
that a single manufacturer or supplier has the full control over all market mechanisms. 
Therefore, the lack of substitute products and competitors allows the monopolist fixing 
high prices for its products, as the buyers do not have any opportunities to switch to other 
suppliers’ products. As a result, buyers are forced to pay more for purchasing the same 
products, and don’t have any mechanisms to affect the activities of the supplier, or to 
make it change the pricing strategy adopted. In the case of international relations, namely 
in the energy sector, the lack of energy supply alternatives brings even worse 
consequences, and the energy resources are strategic goods which ensure any country’s 
effective operation in all respects, and the level of energy security of an individual state 
largely predefines its overall level of its national security in the long-term perspective. 
Therefore, for the purpose of avoiding the excessive risks associated with the lack of 
effective energy supply alternatives, countries need to develop their effective energy 
security policies aiming in particular to ensure sufficient alternatives in terms of energy 
supplies, namely in order to avoid the excessive use of financial resources. 
 
H2: Usage of the Russian “energy weapon” induces Europe to re-think and 
diversify its energy suppliers. 
Hypothesis 2 has been confirmed. As the Russian Federation is the major supplier 
of oil and natural gas to the European Union, the EU doesn’t have effective alternative 
sources of supplies for diversifying its energy imports. Therefore, as the findings of the 
research prove, the Russian Federation uses this situation in its own interests, and 
therefore the energy resources supplied by the country are not only natural resources, but 
also important geopolitical tools which Russia uses for putting tension on the European 
Union. For the EU, this situation is much negative, and has particularly aggravated with 
the recent aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. In addition to the lack of 
supply alternatives, there are currently no alternative pipeline routes for the transportation 
of energy resources from Russia, and as a result, the dependence of the EU on both 
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Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and the overall geopolitical conjuncture on the continent 
becomes excessively high, which substantially impairs the level of the European Union’s 
energy security. Taking into consideration those negative effects, the European Union’s 
energy policies currently implemented are first of all aimed at diversifying the sources of 
energy supplies, and namely at reducing the Russian Federation’s share in the EU’s 
imports of natural gas and oil. This is a key prerequisite for ensuring the European 
Union’s energy security, and thus geopolitical stability in the future. 
 
H3: Supplies of energy from Azerbaijan may help significantly diversify the 
EU’s imports of energy resources.  
Hypothesis 3 has been confirmed. Indeed, Azerbaijan represent a strategic 
opportunity for the European Union as an alternative supplier of energy resources within 
the framework of the European Union’s energy policies aimed at reducing the EU’s 
dependence on energy supplies from the Russian Federation. As the findings of the 
research run within the framework of this thesis testify, Azerbaijan is prospectively a key 
partner of the European Union in the energy sector. On the one hand, this is predefined by 
the fact that Azerbaijan is among the global leaders in terms of the proven oil and natural 
gas reserves, and the country’s production capacities are constantly growing. On the other 
hand, the partnership ties between the European Union and Azerbaijan which have been 
actively developing since the early 1990’s have allowed establishing cooperation in the 
energy sector, which can be seen particularly well in the mutual projects currently 
implemented by Azerbaijan and the EU member states. Namely, the numerous pipeline 
construction projects such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas 
Pipeline, the Nabucco pipeline, etc. prove that the European Union indeed see Azerbaijan 
as a key strategic partner in the field of energy supplies, and Azerbaijan may become a 
major partner contributing to the diversification of natural gas and oil supplies to the 
European Union already in the near future. 
Thus, the findings of the research allow stating Azerbaijan’s essential role for the 
improvement of the European Union’s energy security through diversification of energy 
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supplies. Therefore, further enhancement of cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan 
in this field should be expected in the near future. For Azerbaijan, it would represent great 
economic growth prospects, and the implementation of the mutual projects described 





Energy resources are strategic natural resources which to the largest extent 
predefine any country’s effective economic activities. As a result, the level of provision 
with energy resources and the level of an individual state’s energy security greatly 
precondition its geopolitical sovereignty, and the ability to run independent policies in all 
fields of international cooperation. Taking into account the essential role of energy 
resources in any state’s successful activities, the supplies of energy resources are one of 
the most important factors for ensuring a high level of national security, and the suppliers 
of such resources have competitive advantages in terms of both the economic benefits 
they gain and the geopolitical impact they are able to use thanks to their abundance in 
energy resources. 
For the European Union, the world’s largest and most successful regional 
integration formation, the provision of a high level of energy security has become of key 
importance. The supranational formation doesn’t have sufficient internal resources for 
satisfying the needs of its industrial sector and the population in natural gas and oil, and 
therefore is forced to import those energy resources from abroad. As of today, most 
hydrocarbon imports in the European Union come from the Russian Federation, which 
imposes significant threats on the European Union member states which do not have any 
effective alternative sources of energy supplies, and therefore remain much dependent on 
Russia in both economic and geopolitical terms. This understanding has promoted the 
European Union’s desire to diversify the sources of energy supplies, and to use more 
intensively other sources of energy, namely non-traditional ones. As of today, the two 
vectors make an integral part of the European Union member states’ policies implemented 
in the field of energy security. 
In terms of the geographic diversification of the energy supply sources, a 
particularly important alternative for the European Union is represented by the countries 
of the Caspian Basin, namely by Azerbaijan. Those states are abundant in oil and natural 
gas, and their close geographic location allows developing plans for their subsequent 
inclusion in the energy supply infrastructure of the European Union. 
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Azerbaijan has remained a major producer of oil and natural gas throughout its 
recent history. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country undertook significant 
efforts to effectively re-boost its energy sector, which became possible in particular thank 
to the investments on the part of the European Union, and the involvement of major 
Western European corporations in the programs for the development of the Azerbaijani 
oil-and-gas industry. This laid a strong basis for the subsequent development of the EU-
Azerbaijani relations in the energy sector, which as of today represent a particular interest 
for both Azerbaijan and the European Union. This is testified by the growing turnover of 
energy supplies from Azerbaijan, and by the large-scale mutual projects implemented by 
the EU and Azerbaijan in the field of oil and natural gas supplies. The benefits brought by 
such cooperation allow stating that both Azerbaijan and the EU will aim to strengthen it in 
the near future. 
Taking into account the current level of cooperation between Azerbaijan and the 
European Union in the energy sector, and the aims followed by the European Union in 
terms of the diversification of energy supplies and the reduction of the Russian 
Federation’s share in the EU’s aggregate oil and natural gas imports, further growth in the 
turnover and deepening of cooperation between Azerbaijan and the European Union 
should be expected in the near future. Both the EU and Azerbaijan are much interested in 
developing such effective cooperation for the purpose of not only obtaining economic 
benefits, but also in order to reduce their geopolitical dependence on Russia, and thus in 
order to raise their level of geopolitical sovereignty through improved energy security. 
The completion of the projects currently implemented or planned for implementation 
between Azerbaijan and the European Union would provide both the South Caucasian 
state and the European Union with far greater prospects for increasing their cooperation 
and ensuring their high level of energy security, which is one of the ultimate goals of their 
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